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Summary 
The aim of the paper is to give suggestions about how an agri-environment index can be 
designed by taking into account specific ecological and economical factors that reflect 
benefits and costs of biodiversity conservation. Main findings are that the general structure of 
an agri-environment index is recommended to be a benefits-to-cost ratio, whereby the 
conservation benefits are accounted for by the following factors which evaluate i) certain 
criteria that value the ecological quality of a site and point out its significance for biodiversity 
conservation (Conservation Significance Factor), ii) a criterion that reflects the connectivity 
of the site which is an important factor for species migration (Connectivity Factor) and iii) 
criteria that estimate the potential biodiversity outcomes induced by specific management 
actions (Conservation Management Factor). The Cost Factor reflects the amount of money 
that the landholder demands as compensation payment for his conservation services. The 
paper points out that an agri-environment index is a promising approach to encourage and 
compensate farmers for biodiversity-friendly management actions. Thereby, an improvement 
of the effectiveness and efficiency of European conservation payment schemes is a decisive 
contribution to biodiversity conservation in agricultural landscapes. 
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1. Introduction 
The United Nations proclaimed 2010 to be the International Year of Biodiversity. Europe’s 
biodiversity currently faces a rapid loss within agricultural landscapes, which implies a 
decline of various ecosystem services that are of socio-economic value. Against this 
background, increasing attention is to be paid to farming practices that contribute to the 
maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Therefore, the 
development of conservation payment schemes that take account for the costs and benefits of 
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biodiversity conservation management actions is a major challenge for present European agri-
environmental policy.  
Agri-environment schemes (AES) that aim to conserve biodiversity on agricultural lands 
beyond mandatory standards for agricultural practice (EAFRD REGULATION, article 39(2), 
(3)), are the most important European policy instrument to conserve biodiversity on private 
lands. A main issue of biodiversity conservation payment schemes in general – and of AES in 
particular – is the allocation of limited financial resources for a maximum level of 
biodiversity conservation. Thus, a central point of conservation schemes is to achieve 
budgetary cost-effectiveness – which means maximizing environmental gain (or in this case 
maximizing biodiversity conservation) given an available budget (CATTANEO ET AL. 2005; 
CLAASSEN ET AL. 2008). The challenge of such payment schemes is to choose those 
landowners out of a list of applicants who can provide biodiversity conservation most 
comprehensively and at the lowest costs. A promising approach to evaluate and compare 
applications according to specific criteria in order to target investments for maximizing the 
gain in conserving biodiversity seems to be the development and application of an agri-
environment index (AEI).  
An AEI can be defined as “a set of measurable indicators that are combined to quantify the 
benefits of investing in a given location, project, or region. The AEI is a numéraire (unit of 
value) that provides a relative […] measure of benefit arising from one investment option 
(e.g., farm, site, project, region) compared to another.” (HAJKOWICZ ET AL. 2009: 221). 
Depending on the design of the conservation payment scheme, the AEI can also contain – 
besides the measurement of benefits – a cost factor. This factor can for instance evaluate the 
monetary costs of a given project and enables a cost-benefit equation of different investment 
options. 
Accordingly, the leading question of this paper is how an AEI can be designed to quantify 
the biodiversity conservation benefits and costs of a given investment option within a 
biodiversity conservation payment scheme. In order to specify suggestions for the design of 
an AEI, the focus will lie on biodiversity conservation in grasslands. This specific habitat type 
is chosen for two main reasons. Grasslands are among the most biodiversity rich habitat types 
in Europe (EC 2008) and the area of grasslands declines steadily (EC 2008; BFN 2009). 
Moreover, the conservation and recreation of semi-natural habitats (like grasslands) via the 
use of government incentives is politically intended, like for example by the German 
‘National Strategy on Biological Diversity’ (BMU 2007).  
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Within the paper, two different environmental indices are used as role models: the 
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) and the Biodiversity Benefits Index (BBI). These 
specific indices are chosen, because they are successfully approved in conservation payment 
schemes in the USA and Australia, and can provide relevant information for designing an 
AEI, although they do not particularly concentrate on biodiversity conservation in grassland 
habitats. Based on former experiences, suggestions will be discussed, what specific factors an 
AEI may contain to quantify the prospective biodiversity conservation benefits and – 
depending on the scheme configuration – how a cost factor may be implemented into an AEI. 
Finally, an AEI will be developed on the basis of the discussed factors and limitations. 
 
2. The Environmental Benefits Index (EBI)  
The US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is a voluntary conservation payment scheme 
that was originally established under the Food Security Act in 1985 to offer annual payments 
to private landholders for reducing soil erosion on highly erodible cropland. With the years 
the aim of the programme expanded to protecting or enhancing environmentally sensitive 
cropland and pasture (USDA 2007). 
As part of the general sign-up, landowners with eligible land compete in a national 
procurement auction for acceptance. The bids are offered during specified enrolment periods 
and state what land will be enrolled, what land cover would be established and the desired 
payment (bid price). Then each eligible bid is ranked in comparison to all other bids on the 
basis of the so called Environmental Benefits Index (EBI). All bids with EBI-scores above a 
certain cut-off level (that is determined for each period after the bids are received) are 
accepted. The bid price – that has to be below a soil-specific maximum bid cap – is taken 
account of in the EBI, whereby the EBI increases if the bid price per acre is relatively low 
(USDA 2007; CLAASSEN ET AL. 2008).  
The EBI is used since 1990 (starting with sign-up 10) in order to rank bids according to a 
broader set of environmental objectives and the costs of the contract (bid price per acre). 
Since then, the practice of accepting all bids, that where under a pre-defined bid limit, ended 
and only a proportion of proposed CRP contracts have been accepted in a given sign-up 
period (SMITH 2003; USDA 2007; CLAASSEN ET AL. 2008). The EBI currently contains six 
main factors (N1-N6) to assess the estimated environmental benefits for the land offered and 
the bid price. The EBI score of an offer (i) will be accounted as: N1i + N2i + N3i + N4i + N5i 
+ N6i .The six main factors contain sub factors that can reach a certain points score and are 
added up to determine the points score of the main factor (e.g. N1=N1a+N1b+N1c). All 
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factors and sub factors as well as the weights (the maximum achievable score for each factor 
and sub-factor) are determined before the beginning of each sign-up period and can vary in 
composition and weighting from period to period (USDA 1999; USDA 2006; USDA 2007).  
All in all, the EBI contains three major (wildlife habitat, water quality and soil erodibility) 
and two minor environmental benefits factors (enduring benefits and air quality) where totally 
395 environmental points can be achieved. The cost factor (N6) is included in the EBI since 
the 13th sign-up period. Before that, offers were ranked according to the ratio of the EBI as 
part of the contract costs.  
Since its application the EBI has been used to allocate US$ 29 billion (HAJKOWICZ ET AL. 
2009). Thereby it is to be mentioned positively, that the cost-benefit targeting of the EBI is 
suggested to induce environmental cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the EBI substantially 
increased environmental benefits of the CRP (CLAASSEN ET AL. 2008). 
Beside these positive aspects, there are critics about the EBI design. The first critical issue 
is that the individual main factors of the EBI are additive. This means that a poor performance 
in one indicator can be easily compensated by a strong performance of another. The second 
criticism is that the cost factor is one of the weighted indicators within the EBI. This implies 
that the bid requires a minimum environmental score to be accepted, which means that 
restoration activities with smaller environmental benefits and higher input cost in the 
beginning are presumably disadvantaged compared with other conservation activities. 
Moreover, the costs – that account for approx. 27.5% of the EBI – are not directly compared 
with the benefits and therefore do not correctly provide an objective cost-benefit-measure for 
the sites. 
 
3. The Biodiversity Benefits Index (BBI) 
The BBI was first adopted in the Australian BushTender trial3, which is a voluntary auction-
based program designed to help improve management and protection of native vegetation for 
biodiversity on private land (DSE 2009a). Unlike the US-American CRP, the Australian 
BushTender trial has one single objective – the conservation of remaining native vegetation 
and thus the protection of native species, which are to a large extend threatened and 
endangered.4 The programme uses the approach of conservation procurement auctions, with 
discriminatory payments, in which landholders competitively bid for contracts to undertake 
                                                 
3 BushTender is a registered trademark of the State of Victoria (Department of Sustainability and Environment). 
4 In Victoria 12% of the remaining native vegetation is on private land and occupies 30% of Victoria´s threatened species. 
Moreover 60% of the native vegetation on private land is a threatened vegetation type (which means that its conservation 
status is endangered, vulnerable or depleted) (DSE 2008b).  
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specified management actions5 (DSE 2008a; DSE 2008b). The first trial was held in 
2001/2002 in two different regions of Victoria (DSE 2008d).  
The BBI recognizes for each individual bid, the range of biodiversity values across the 
landscape, the diversity of landholder’s conservation actions and the range of outcomes 
generated by these (DSE 2008a). Therefore the BBI contains one indirect element – the 
‘Current Site Quality’ upon which further calculations are based – and three direct elements: 
the ‘Biodiversity Significance Score (BSS)’, the ‘Habitat Services Score (HSS)’ and the 
‘Cost’ factor. The product of the BSS and HSS depict together the relative benefits of the 
respective site. The cost factor contains the full landowners costs of management actions, 
which are submitted in the bid price ($ of landholders bid). The BBI is the result of the 
benefits-to-cost ratio.  
Within the first two trials, the BBI was used to allocate a sum of A$1,200,000 for the 
protection of around 4800 ha (DSE 2008a). The fact that 84-94% of the landholders made 
satisfactory progress and the level of compliance rates increased with each year participating 
in the trial, shows that the biodiversity benefits substantially increased due to the BushTender 
trial. Moreover, a gain of totally 653 habitat hectares as well as an enhancement of the quality 
of 1,785 ha of 39 rare and threatened EVCs has been achieved in the two trials.  
Overall there are several advantages of the BBI structure. The first positive feature of the 
BBI is that the bids are evaluated after the ‘best value for money’ principle. This means that 
bids with high biodiversity benefits (numerator) and low costs (denominator) get a high BBI 
result and thus a high rank in the selection procedure. The Tender Evaluation Panel 
determines the cut-off point (the point that divides successful from unsuccessful bidders) by 
considering the available marginal cost curve. Secondly, and in comparison to the EBI, it 
should be pointed out that the BBI accounts the biodiversity benefits in a hybrid functional 
from – whereby the main benefit factors (HSS x BSS) are multiplicative and the subfactors 
are added up to get a main factor. This approach implies that a poor performance in one main 
factor (e.g. the HSS) can not easily be compensated by a strong performance in another main 
factor. Moreover, the cost factor of the BBI is not embedded in the benefits calculation, unlike 
in the EBI, which provides an objective cost-benefit-evaluation of the sites. Another 
advantage of the BBI is that it uses information from two critical perspectives for calculating 
the biodiversity benefits – namely the regional scale information (e.g. vegetation and species 
conservation status, position in the landscape) and information from the sites scale (e.g. 
                                                 
5 Common conservation actions encompass: “fencing to control grazing by stock; excluding stock or adopting grazing 
practices to maximize vegetation quality; weed and pest animal control above current responsibilities ; retaining trees, native 
understorey, logs, fallen branches and leaf litter; and supplementary planting into existing patches of native vegetation” (DSE 
2009a: 3). 
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vegetation type and quality, rare and threatened species populations and habitat suitability, 
landholders actions).  
Besides the positive features there are also some critical aspects to be mentioned. A 
critical issue of the BushTender trial and the adoption of the BBI is that it carries high 
transactions costs. On-site research, ecological scoring and administrative costs of the auction 
process amounted in the first trial to approx. 50-60% of the budget used in the auction. But 
these costs are assumed to diminish as experience is gained over. Also it might be criticised is 
that a lot of sites of high biodiversity significance are not successful in the bidding process, 
because the respective landholder offers a poor value for money bid. Doubtful is whether this 
payment scheme design is an appropriate conservation instrument for sites of high 
biodiversity value. The last controversial issue concerns the application of the habitat hectares 
approach. PARKES ET AL. (2003) state that the approach has to be regarded critically for an 
assessment of all treeless vegetation types (e.g. grasslands and wetlands), because the ‘site 
condition’ assessment criteria mainly concentrate on attributes that are related to trees. 
Therefore is can be criticised that this approach is adopted in the BBI for the assessment of all 
vegetation types.  
 
4. Suggestions for the design of an agri-environment index  
4.1.1. Basic considerations 
Based on experiences from the EBI and the BBI, suggestions for the design of an AEI – 
considering its adoption in a payment scheme for biodiversity conservation in grasslands – 
will be discussed. Before analysing which potential individual factors an AEI should contain, 
some pre-considerations have to be outlined. 
In order to design an AEI, it is first of all important upon which specific grassland types 
the payment scheme will concentrate on. Shall all grassland types be able to participate in the 
scheme? Or shall only so far extensively managed grassland types be able to participate, as 
recommended by KLEIJN AND SUTHERLAND (2003). Further suggestions about the design of 
an AEI will be based on the assumption that species-poor intensive used grassland types and 
sowed grassland and miscellaneous pastures will be excluded from participation in a payment 
scheme.6 In this case it seems useful to determine specific criteria that can identify the target 
grassland types and exclude all other types from participation. 
Former advantages and disadvantages have shown that a hybrid functional form 
(according to the BBI) – whereby several sub-factors are added up to build a main factor and 
                                                 
6 A similar approach can be found in the result-orientated AES of Lower Saxony (MOST ET AL. 2006). 
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the main factors are multiplied to get the benefits score – is practical and recommendable for 
calculating prospective conservation benefits. This approach gives each main benefit factor 
more weight than in a purely additive calculation (like in the EBI), because a poor 
performance in one main factor can not easily be compensated by a strong performance in 
another main factor. For that reason, the suggestion for the design of an AEI will be built 
upon this hybrid functional form.  
The design of an AEI is dependent on the scheme configuration. Further suggestions about 
the AEI will be made on the basis of a payment scheme configuration that is action- and 
result-orientated, in order to share the risk of failing the environmental goal between 
landowner and conservation agency. Moreover, it will be assumed that the potential 
participators will be selected by a conservation procurement auction with discriminatory 
payments, because this scheme outlay is suggested to use public funds more cost-effectively 
than current fixed flat-rate payment schemes (e.g. LATACZ-LOHMANN AND VAN DER 
HAMSVOORT 1997; STONEHAM ET AL. 2003; CJC CONSULTING 2004; NATIONAL MARKET 
BASED INSTRUMENTS WORKING GROUP 2005; GROTH 2007; GROTH 2009). 
 
4.2. Quantifying the benefits for biodiversity conservation 
In order to quantify prospective biodiversity conservation benefits, three main categories will 
be considered similar to the BBI. The ‘Conservation Significance Factor (CSF)’ mainly 
reflects attributes that are suggested to positively affect the ecological quality of a site and 
point out its significance for biodiversity conservation in grasslands. Whereas the 
‘Connectivity Factor (CF)’ regards the conservation significance from a regional perspective 
and evaluates the function of the site in the broader landscape (e.g. how it is integrated in a 
broader habitat network). The ‘Conservation Management Factor (CMF)’ is supposed to 
estimate the potential biodiversity outcomes from the landholder’s management actions. 
These three main factors – the conservation significance of the site, spatial influences and a 
steady conservation management – are identified to be important factors for the performance 
of conservation payment schemes. The factors will be discussed with regard to specific 
evaluation criteria and corresponding assessment approaches. There will be no precise 
suggestions for the weighting of each factor. 
 
4.2.1. Conservation Significance Factor (CSF)  
Regarding the Conservation Significance of a grassland site, three different criteria and 
respective assessment approaches will be discussed. 
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First of all it is questionable if a grassland site of larger size can be regarded as serving 
better for biodiversity conservation than a site of smaller size. If there may be a positive 
correlation between area size and biodiversity conservation in grasslands, the AEI should 
contain a size factor. For comparison, the EBI does not contain a size factor, whereas in the 
BBI the size is regarded in calculating the current site quality and the BSS. Between 
ecologists this question is discussed controversially in the so called SLOSS-debate – Do 
single large or several small areas serve better for nature conservation? The origin of the 
debate began with the thesis of DIAMOND (1975) that one single large area is preferable to 
several small areas for the survivability of species, with the assumption that all areas are of 
the same type of environment. Many kinds of species (especially large carnivores) can be 
better protected in larger habitats, because these can contain larger populations and feature a 
wider range of environmental conditions (HUNTER AND GIBBS 2007). But LESICA AND 
ALLENDORF (1992) state that smaller patches play an important role for conserving plant 
species, because small plant populations within stressful environmental conditions loose their 
genetic variability more slowly than plant species in more benign environments. Moreover, 
VIROLAINEN ET AL. (1998) point out, that several small mires contain more vascular plant 
species as well as more rare species and a higher taxonomic diversity than a single large mire 
of totally equal size. One conclusion of this debate can be that both large and small habitats 
are valuable for nature conservation. Large patches should be protected in order to minimize 
extinctions, and small reserves to maximize species diversity. As a result of this controversial 
debate, it will be not recommended to integrate a size factor in an AEI. 
For determining the conservation significance of a grassland habitat (resp. the pre-
condition of the site), it is possible to evaluate if several indicator species occur on the site 
that signify extensively managed and species-rich grassland of notable conservation 
significance. It has been shown that a quantification of pre-defined indicator plant species on 
a specific site is positively correlated with the actual plant species richness of this site in the 
most examined cases (MOST ET AL. 2006). This aspect makes the approach interesting for an 
application to determine different levels of conservation significance of grassland habitats. 
But there are also some difficulties. Since plant species are dependent on the region and 
specific grassland types, one cannot simplify that a site with e.g. 12 flowering indicator plant 
species is of higher conservation significance than a site with e.g. 8 indicator species. For 
instance, certain wet and humid grassland types feature frequently not a certain amount of the 
pre-defined indicator plant species. Therefore it is regarded critically to use this method in the 
AEI. The approach was basically designed for a result-orientated payment scheme in order to 
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exclude species-poor intensively used grasslands from participation and to distinguish 
between species-poor mesophile grassland and species-rich mesophile grassland as well as 
grassland types of category. Hence, it would make no sense to build more that these two 
‘vegetation quality levels’, because for increasing levels (of 7 and more indicator species) an 
uniform indicator species list cannot be adopted for identifying higher conservation 
significance levels over different regions and grassland types. 
Another approach is not to look at specific species but to identify grassland types (due to a 
common vegetation classification) and to rank different types according to their conservation 
significance, like in sub-factor N1a of the EBI. A difficulty in this approach can be to 
determine objective criteria why, for instance, grassland type x is of higher significance than 
grassland type y. According to the BBI, vegetation types can be ranked based on their 
regional degree of exposure. But how can that be applied on German grasslands? A possible 
approach is the ‘red list of vulnerable German habitat types’ (RIECKEN ET AL. 2006), in which 
the conservation significance of German habitat types is evaluated by one quantitative and 
one qualitative criterion: i) the vulnerability of habitats due to area decline (quantitative) and 
ii) the vulnerability due to qualitative alteration (as a result of negative anthropogenic impacts 
on e.g. structural habitat characteristics and/or on habitat-typical species composition).  
 
4.2.2. Connectivity Factor (CF) 
The success of species conservation depends to a large extend on the connectivity of the site. 
HUNTER AND GIBBS (2007) state that connectivity ensures four basic kinds of species 
movements: i) relatively small-scale daily movements of fauna species among the patches of 
their preferred home-range habitat, ii) annual migrations of animals, iii) dispersal movements, 
which are vital for keeping the species of a patch connected with other populations and iv) 
range shifts of species due to changing environmental conditions, like climate change. All in 
all, the design of a connection should depend on the kinds of organisms and the types of 
movements it was intended to accommodate (HUNTER AND GIBBS 2007). 
For evaluating the connectivity of sites the EBI formerly measured the distance to the next 
protected area, whereas the BBI contains more comprehensive connectivity measures. The 
Habitat Score – that determines the current site quality – includes two connectivity measures: 
‘neighbourhood’ and ‘distance to core area’, which are both assessed by using a geographic 
information system (GIS). The neighbourhood factor evaluates the degree of linked and 
unlinked surrounding native vegetation by laying three radii (of 100m, 1km and 5km) around 
the centroid of the concerned site. Then it will be approximately assessed what proportion of 
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the area within a circle is covered by native vegetation, by using 20% intervals. After 
multiplying each factor with a specific weight, the scores are summed up and determine the 
total neighbourhood score. 
The second connectivity measure ‘distance to core area’, assess the distance to the nearest 
patch of native vegetation which is greater than 50 ha: 5 SP are rewarded for a contiguous 
patch, 4 SP (score points) for a distance under 1 km, etc. Regarding the BBI, the connectivity 
is also being assessed in the BSS but more precise information about this calculation is not 
provided in the official document (DSE 2008a). 
The last approach of measuring connectivity as the distance to the nearest core area is 
discussed controversially. MOILANEN AND NIEMINEN (2002) state that so called nearest 
neighbourhood measures are too simple for most terrestrial metapopulations because other 
patches that are within an adequate migration range from the focal patch are neglected. Other 
connectivity measures, like the neighbourhood analysis that belongs to the so called ‘buffer 
measures’, are evaluated to be more complex and precise. But for a well working connectivity 
measure, the radius of this method has to be optimally chosen depending on the particular 
habitat structures. Furthermore, regarding this method two points can be seen controversially. 
First, all patches within a given radius are regarded but these patches are weighted equally 
and the distance effect is not included. Moreover, buffer measures are step function of 
distance, which implies that patches outside the radius cannot be colonized. This makes them 
unrealistic for predicting large-scale dynamics of meta-populations. Another option is the use 
of so called ‘Incidence Function Models’ (IFM), that take into account distances to all 
possible source populations and the migration range distribution. But this measure can only be 
adopted if this comprehensive information (about e.g. the mitigation range distribution) are 
known and if only a few specific species are considered. Therefore, the IFM measure seems to 
be not convenient to be adopted in an AEI and measuring the distance to the next core area 
(nearest neighbourhood measure) is too simple. Hence, it is discussable if a buffer measure, 
like the neighbourhood analysis of PARKES ET AL. (2003) (or a similar buffer measure) is an 
appropriate approach for measuring the connectivity of sites for the AEI.  
 
4.2.3. Conservation Management Factor (CMF)  
The Conservation Management Factor can evaluate the following aspects. Due to the 
precondition that the AEI is supposed to be adopted in a result- and action orientated payment 
scheme it makes sense to include an evaluation of the specific conservation actions the 
landholder is supposed to undertake. Another aspect that is useful to be assessed is if the 
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landholder has formerly managed the site extensively (with no fertilizer application etc.), 
which is suggested to be a decisive question for the performance of conservation schemes. In 
this respect the continued motivation of farmers to participate in the payment scheme is also 
vital for the prospective conservation of the site. 
Regarding the question which conservation actions should be evaluated and rewarded with 
different SP, further knowledge about how far different forms of conservation management 
actions affect grassland biodiversity in a positive way is needed. In the EBI – more precise in 
factor N1a – different cover practices (CP) are regarded and those that are suggested to be 
more beneficial for biodiversity conservation are assigned more SP, than CP that are regarded 
to be less beneficial. But this approach is more result-orientated than action-orientated. The 
BBI considers potential maintenance gain in the HSS for protecting the current site quality 
and potential improvement gain for conservation actions that go beyond legislative 
obligations and improve the quality of the site. This basic concept seems convincing, although 
the particular method of regarding the maintenance and improvement of individual factors of 
the ‘habitat hectares approach’ of PARKES ET AL. (2003) can not be adopted in grasslands. 
Hence, a list of possible management actions that maintain and/or enhance biodiversity in 
grasslands can serve for evaluating the action-based component of the AEI. In this regard the 
regulations of the EAFRD Regulation have to be taken care of, so that only actions which go 
“beyond the relevant mandatory standards“(EAFRD REGULATION, article 39(3)) are rewarded 
in the AEI. Some conservation measures that are vital for grassland biodiversity conservation 
should be determined as obligatory, like the abandonment of fertilizer application on the 
specific site. Which explicit conservation management actions the list should contain and 
what SP are rewarded can not be answered in this scope. 
Furthermore it is suggested to reward SP to landholders who formerly participated in 
conservation payment schemes, similar to the factor ‘prior management gain’ in the HSS. 
Thus, the enduring existence of already ‘produced’ ecological values is aimed to be secured. 
Likewise it is suggested to reward SP for the length of the prospective contract obligations 
(how long the landholder is willing to take part in the conservation payment scheme), 
according to the factor ‘length of contract’ of the HSS in the BBI. For both aspects the 
number of years can be counted: years of prior conservation management plus years of 
prospective management obligations. Another option is to cluster the years and assign certain 
categories to different score point levels: e.g. 5 SP for 1-5 years of prior (prospective) 
management, 10 SP for 6-10 years, etc. 
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4.3. Quantifying the costs of biodiversity conservation 
There are several ways how the cost factor can be included in an AEI. Within a first approach 
all cost considerations are excluded from the evaluation procedure, thus the AEI does not 
include a cost factor. This means that those applications with the highest environmental score 
are accepted – regardless how costly they are – until the budget is exhausted. This approach is 
for instance used in the current result-orientated schemes with fixed flat-rate payments of 
Lower Saxony and Baden-Württemberg. When costs are excluded from the evaluation 
procedure, applications that do not reach a certain environmental score are rejected although 
they are probably more environmentally cost-effective than applications above the cut-off line 
that are accepted. If the instrument conservation procurement auction (with discriminatory 
payments) – as a pre-condition for the design of the here proposed AEI – is applied to this 
approach, the amount of payment can be assigned for instance to the environmental score. 
E.g. for a score of 200 points the landholder gets 200 $/acre (€/ha). But this is an uncommon 
approach – usually conservation procurement auctions with discriminatory payments include 
a cost factor in their evaluation procedure and the payment depends on the landowners offer. 
The second approach is applied in the Australian BushTender trial, whereby applicants are 
assessed on the basis of a benefits-to-cost ratio. An outstanding advantage of this approach is 
that a larger number of applicants and hence acres (or ha) will be accepted by the programme 
in comparison to the first approach. This may possibly lead to an overall higher level of 
budgetary cost-effectiveness. A disadvantage is that some applicants may only be accepted 
because their adopted conservation measures are very cheap and hence provide only minimal 
conservation benefits. A solution might be an obligatory minimum level of conservation 
benefits. 
The third approach is an intermediate one as applied in the US-American CRP in which 
additional points are rewarded for cost-effectiveness. The more cost-effectiveness is 
emphasised by the payment scheme the steeper is the slope of the cut-off line. 
 
4.4. Suggestions for the design of an AEI 
According to the previous findings, an AEI that can be adopted in a result- and action-
orientated payment scheme for biodiversity conservation in German grasslands with 
discriminatory payments can be structured as follows. The general design of the AEI is 
suggested to be a benefits-to-costs ratio – conservation benefits as numerator and the costs as 
denominator – according to the BBI: 
CostFactor
CSFxCFxCMFAEI =  
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Conservation Significance Factor (CSF): The CSF can be determined by the respective 
grassland type (ascertained due to a common vegetation classification) and its conservation 
significance – vulnerability degree of quantitative area decline and qualitative habitat 
alteration – according to the German red list of vulnerable habitat types. 
 
Connectivity Factor (CF): The CF can be determined by a connectivity measure, like a buffer 
measure (e.g. similar to the approach of the neighbourhood analysis of Parkes et al. (2003)).  
 
Conservation Management Factor (CMF): The CMF can be determined by a list that contains 
a broad range of management activities that serve for grassland biodiversity conservation. 
Each management activity is assigned a certain number of SP according to how effective this 
measure is estimated for maintaining or enhancing biodiversity conservation in grasslands. 
Additionally the years of former participation in a conservation scheme as well as the years of 
future contract obligations can be accounted in the CMF. 
 
Cost Factor: The cost factor can be determined by taking the respective bid price per hectare 
(€/ha) of each applicant into account. Because there is no size factor in the numeration, an 
absolute measure like the full bid price cannot be used for an evaluation. Therefore a relative 
measure (e.g. costs per hectare) – like in the EBI will be suggested in this context. 
 
Since species-poor intensively used grassland types as well as sowed grassland and 
miscellaneous pastures will be excluded from scheme participation the payment scheme needs 
an approach to determine the threshold for participation. For this purpose the approach of 
using a pre-defined index list of flowering plant species to identify extensively managed and 
species-rich grassland should be adopted. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The conservation of biodiversity in grasslands depends mostly on payment schemes that 
mainly stipulate specific conservation management activities – so called action-orientated 
AES. Certain aspects, which are critical for the performance of those schemes, are formally 
not considered and evaluated, like e.g. the precondition and connectivity of the funded 
grassland site. For enhancing the success of payment schemes for biodiversity conservation in 
grasslands as well as the budgetary cost-effectiveness of funding such sites, a certain scheme 
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design is regarded to be promising. Such a scheme selects its participants in a conservation 
procurement auction process by applying an AEI that evaluates different result- and action-
based criteria, which should quantify the prospective benefits and costs of biodiversity 
conservation on a specific grassland site. Successful applicants receive a payment that is 
based on their individual bids (discriminatory payments), which mostly reflect their costs for 
provisioning and managing the property for biodiversity conservation.  
On the basis of the previous findings, the recommended design of an AEI is as follows. 
The general structure should be a benefits-to-costs ratio with a quantification of the 
prospective benefits of a grassland site for biodiversity conservation in the numerator and a 
cost factor in the denominator. The evaluation of the benefits contains three factors: the 
Conservation Significance Factor (CSF), the Connectivity Factor (CF) and the Conservation 
Management Factor (CMF). The Cost Factor can be determined by taking the respective bid 
price per hectare (€/ha) that the applicant will demand as compensation payment for the 
conservation services. 
There should be no doubt, that it is important to change the current practice of payment 
schemes for biodiversity conservation and to implement schemes that effectively induce 
incentives to maintain grassland sites that are of high conservation significance. An AEI 
seems to be a convenient instrument to identify applicants who can provide biodiversity 
conservation on high-quality grassland habitats at low costs and thus to allocate limited public 
funds in a cost-effective way. The here given suggestions for a general design of an AEI as 
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